000			03468nam a2200277Ia 4500
001			349108
003			0000000000
005			20210823100725.0
008			190115t20192019dcu b 001 0 eng
020			_a9780813231570
040			_aAEA-IRC _cAEA-IRC
050			_aB 765.T54 _b.K121 2019
100			_aKahm, Nicholas, _953650
245		0	_aAquinas on emotion's participation in reason / _cNicholas Kahm.
260			_aWashington, D.C. : _bCatholic University of America Press, _c[2019].
264			_aWashington, D.C. : _bCatholic University of America Press, _c[2019].
300			_axii, 319 pages ; _c24 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 297-313) and index.
505			_aThe soul as a potential whole -- Fragmentation of the soul into parts -- The unification of the soul's parts -- Disorder in the potential whole -- Order in the potential whole -- Participating in reason -- Participation -- Powers and passions in Aquinas's Sentences commentary -- Participation and virtue in Aquinas's Sentences commentary -- Participation in reason in the De veritate -- Participating parts in late texts -- Participation and virtue in late texts -- Conclusion of part 2 -- The plausibility of Aquinas's position -- What moral virtue does and does not do -- Kant, Aristotle, and social psychology -- Select bibliography.
520			_a he is certainly not, as is he is often thought to be, the faithful follower of Aristotle and the polar opposite of Kant. Nicholas Kahm argue that Aquinas has a realistic and plausible view of how far reason can go in shaping our emotions. Furthermore, his plausible views can accommodate the serious current challenge raised against virtue ethics from social psychology. The method has mainly been a careful reading of primary texts, but unlike the rest of the scholarship on Aquinas's ethics, Kahm is particularly sensitive to Aquinas's historical and philosophical development.
520			_aAquinas on Emotion's Participation in Reason aims to present Aquinas's answer to the perennial and now popular question: In what way can the emotions be rational? For Aquinas, the starting point of this inquiry is Aristotle's claim (EN. I. 13) that there are three parts to the soul: 1) the rational part, 2) the non-rational part which can participate in reason, and 3) the non-rational part that does not participate in reason. It is the extent to which the second part (the sense appetites, the seat of the emotions) participates in reason that the emotions can become rational. However, immediately after Aristotle introduces his tripartite division of the soul, he warns that one need not delve into the details of the division or the participation. Aquinas, however, ignores Aristotle, and uses his precise metaphysics of participation within in his sophisticated anthropology to great effect in his ethics. Unlike Aristotle, to fully understand Aquinas's thinking on how the emotions can become rational, we simply must delve into the kinds of precisions that Aristotle thinks are misplaced. When Aquinas's views emerge from these precisions, he has a surprisingly level-headed and commonsense view of how the emotions can become rational. On this point, he is more pessimistic than Aristotle and more optimistic than Kant
650			_aEmotions (Philosophy). _953651
650			_aReason. _953652
942			_2lcc _cCIRC
999			_c31704 _d31704