000 01880nam a2200313Ia 4500
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005 20211104001643.0
008 070907s19uu 000 0 eng d
020 _a9715640842
040 _aAEA
_cAEA
_erda
050 _aHC 411
_b.T27 2006
100 _aTerada-Hagiwara, Akiko
_998313
245 0 _aExperience of crisis-hit Asian Countries :
_bdo asset management companies increase moral hazard? /
_cAkiko Terada-Hagiwara and Gloria Pasadilla
264 _aMakati City :
_bPhilippine Institute for Development Studies,
_c2006
300 _av, 41 pages :
_billustrations ;
_c23 cm.
336 _atext
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_2rdacarrier
520 _aThis paper examines the performances of Asian asset management companies (AMCs). The analysis reveals that the AMCs vary significantly in their design and performances. The authors claim that AMCs can trigger moral hazard-inspired bank lending, especially when the mode of transfer of nonperforming loans (NPLs) from banks to AMCs entails little cost to banks. The new centralized AMC, the Thai Asset Management Company (TAMC), on the other hand, decreased the new NPL ratio, suggesting that TAMC provokes no adverse moral hazard effect on financial institutions. In addition, they find that the same institutional consideration significantly decreases new NPL in foreign banks and finance companies.
650 _aBank loans
_zAsia
_2sears
_998314
650 _aBank management
_zAsia.
_2sears
_998315
650 _aFinancial crises
_zAsia
_2sears
_998218
700 _aPasadilla, Gloria.
_998316
942 _cPIDS
999 _c67751
_d67751