000			03914nam a2200325Ia 4500
001			176890
003			0000000000
005			20211104031643.0
008			090319s2009 moumb b a001 0 eng
020			_a9780700616688
035			_a(AEA)4199DF7AF84F47B4AE0942E73999860C
035			_a(OCoLC)317361778
050			_aE 470 _b.M864 2009
100			_aMountcastle, Clay, _d-1972 _9108617
245		0	_aPunitive war : _bconfederate guerrillas and union reprisals / _cClay Mountcastle.
260			_aLawrence, Kan. : _bUniversity Press of Kansas, _cc2009.
300			_ax, 202 p. : _bill., maps _c24 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p.[181]-192) and index.
505			_aThe American Antebellum experience with guerrilla warfare -- Proving ground for punishment: Pope, Halleck, and Schofield in Missouri -- A remedy for all evils: retaliatory destruction on the Mississippi -- War and individual ruin: Sherman's campaigns of 1864 -- The valley aflame: punitive war in Virginia.
520			_a and civilian bushwhackers waylaid Union pickets. Together, all of these actions persuaded the Union to wage an increasingly punitive war. Clay Mountcastle presents a new look at the complex nature of guerrilla warfare in the Civil War and the Union Army's calculated response to it. He examines guerrilla attacks and Federal responses in a number of operational theaters to show how the problem grew throughout the South and ultimately convinced the Union to adopt retaliatory measures that challenged the sensibilities of even the most hardened soldiers. In revealing the impact that Confederate guerrilla activity had on the Union's prosecution of the war, Mountcastle reveals how the character of the war was shaped every bit as much by the troops on the ground as by their Union leaders. He draws on primary sources that vividly convey their reaction to the guerrilla problem and their justification for punitive action--with guerrillas described by one angry soldier as "thieves and murderers by occupation, rebels by pretense, soldiers only in name, and cowards by nature." Showing how much of the impetus for retaliation originated from the bottom up, starting in the western theater in 1861, he describes how it became the most influential factor in convincing Union generals, especially Grant and Sherman, that the war needed to be extended to include civilians and their property. The result was a level of destructiveness that has been downplayed by other scholars--despite the evidence of executions and incidents of entire towns being burned to the ground. By 1864, punitive action had evolved into such a powerful and decisive force that it produced what has been called "a warfare of frightfulness." And although guerrilla activity deviled the Union until the end, the Union's response ultimately proved a significant factor in persuading leaders like General Lee to call a halt to such actions and, ultimately, to surrender. Mountcastle's book offers the most revealing look yet at this incompletely understood dimension of the Civil War and also raises provocative questions about the relationship between guerrilla and conventional warfare in any conflict. www.alibris.com
520			_a autonomous partisan rangers preyed on Federal railroads, telegraph lines, and supply wagons
520			_aThrough widespread and relentless surprise attacks and ambushes, Confederate guerrillas drove Union soldiers and their leaders to desperation. Confederate cavalrymen engaged in hit-and-run tactics
650			_aCounterinsurgency _zUnited States _9108618
650			_aGuerrilla warfare _zConfederate States of America. _9108619
650			_aGuerrilla warfare _zUnited States _9108620
650			_aGuerrillas _zConfederate States of America. _9108621
650			_aGuerrillas _zUnited States _9108622
942			_cALR
999			_c75704 _d75704